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ABSTRACT
Recently, deep learning-based models have exhibited remark-
able performance for image manipulation detection. How-
ever, most of them suffer from poor universality of hand-
crafted or predetermined features. Meanwhile, they only fo-
cus on manipulation localization and overlook manipulation
classification. To address these issues, we propose a coarse-
to-fine architecture named Constrained R-CNN for complete
and accurate image forensics. First, the learnable manipu-
lation feature extractor learns a unified feature representa-
tion directly from data. Second, the attention region pro-
posal network effectively discriminates manipulated regions
for the next manipulation classification and coarse localiza-
tion. Then, the skip structure fuses low-level and high-level
information to refine the global manipulation features. Fi-
nally, the coarse localization information guides the model
to further learn the finer local features and segment out the
tampered region. Experimental results show that our model
achieves state-of-the-art performance. Especially, the F1
score is increased by 28.4%, 73.2%, 13.3% on the NIST16,
COVERAGE, and Columbia dataset.
Index Terms— Image manipulation detection, coarse-to-
fine, general feature, attention mechanism, end-to-end
1. INTRODUCTION
Image manipulation has been considered as a potential threat,
negatively affecting many aspects of our life, such as fake
news, bogus certificate, malicious rumors, etc. As shown in
Fig. 1, content manipulation is the most harmful forgery type,
because it changes the image content subtly through various
techniques containing splicing, copy-move, and removal. To
shield this threat, image manipulation detection has received
extensive attention, which aims to identify the authenticity of
the content in an image without any prior knowledge.
Early works mainly utilize handcrafted or predetermined
features such as frequency domain characteristics [1] and
color filter array (CFA) pattern [2] to detect manipulated im-
ages. However, these methods cannot apply to real forensics
because the features they employ are always specific-defined
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Fig. 1. Example of tampered images with different content
manipulation techniques. From left to right are different ma-
nipulation techniques as splicing, copy-move, and removal.
for one type of manipulation technique. Recently, deep learn-
ing methods are applied to this task, which improves the gen-
eralizability of models [3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. These models first ex-
tract predetermined features, and then these features are in-
dividually [4] or together [5, 6, 7] fed into the deep learn-
ing model to classify whether a patch or pixel is tampered or
not. Nevertheless, these methods only mitigate the issue of
insufficient generalization ability, they are still fundamentally
limited by handcrafted or predetermined features.
Additionally, we argue that image manipulation detection
contains two goals as How (manipulation techniques classi-
fication) and Where (manipulation localization), which are
equally important in this task. Such as the copy-move im-
age in Fig. 1, if only the mask is provided, we will probably
mistake it as a splicing image. Therefore, if the model only
focuses on one goal, the results of forensics will not be con-
vincing. However, most of recent methods [8, 9, 7] only focus
on Where but overlook How. In [5], although the model con-
siders two goals, it uses bounding box to coarsely localize
manipulation rather than more precise pixel-wise prediction.
According to the above analysis, there exists two major is-
sues in existing works: 1) handcrafted or predetermined fea-
tures limit the generalization ability of models, 2) overlook
the integrity of forensics task. This motivates us to design a
general solution that applies to detect various content manipu-
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Fig. 2. Overview of the proposed architecture for image manipulation detection.
lation, which achieves manipulation techniques classification
and tampered region segmentation simultaneously.
In this paper, we propose Constrained R-CNN, a general,
end-to-end and effective architecture for image manipulation
detection. For the first issue, we design a learnable manipula-
tion feature extractor (LMFE) based on the constrained con-
volution layer [10] to create a unified feature representation of
various content manipulation directly from data. For the sec-
ond issue, we design a two-stages architecture to simulate the
coarse-to-fine forensic process in the real world. More specif-
ically, we optimize the Mask R-CNN [11] on task level, which
consists of two stages: 1) Stage-1, we design an attention re-
gion proposal network (RPN-A) to identify the manipulated
regions for latter manipulation classification and coarse local-
ization. 2) Stage-2, the skip structure fuses the low-level and
high-level information to enhance the global feature repre-
sentation. As prior knowledge, the bounding box information
from Stage-1 guide Stage-2 to focus on the local feature in
bounding box for final tampered region segmentation.
Our main contributions are as follows: 1) A coarse-to-
fine architecture named Constrained R-CNN that achieves
manipulation techniques classification and manipulated re-
gion segmentation simultaneously. 2) A single-stream learn-
able manipulation feature extractor, which creates a unified
feature representation of various content manipulation tech-
niques directly from data. 3) An attention regional proposal
network (RPN-A), which discriminates manipulated regions
effectively. Experiments on four benchmark datasets show
that our model achieves state-of-the-art performance.
2. PROPOSED METHOD
2.1. Overview
In real-world forensics, expert identifies an image following a
coarse-to-fine process. In the coarse stage, the expert roughly
observes the image for approximate manipulation localiza-
tion. In the fine stage, a more detailed analysis of specific
regions, looking for more clues to segment tampered regions.
Inspired by this process, we propose a two-stage archi-
tecture named Constrained R-CNN to simulate the coarse-
Tampered image SRM Constrained Conv Ground-truth
Fig. 3. Constrained Conv vs. SRM filters.
to-fine process. As shown in Fig. 2, Constrained R-CNN
mainly consists of the learnable manipulation feature extrac-
tor (LMFE), the coarse manipulation detection (Stage-1) and
the fine manipulation segmentation (Stage-2). Initially, the
LMFE module captures forgery clues of various content ma-
nipulation and creates a unified feature representation. Next,
Stage-1, containing the attention region proposal network
(RPN-A) and the prediction module, performs manipulation
techniques classification and bounding box regression. In
Stage-2, the skip structure fuses the multi-level information
to enhance global feature representation. As prior knowledge,
the bounding boxes from Stage- 1 guide Stage-2 to focus on
local features for latter manipulation segmentation.
2.2. Learnable manipulation feature extractor
The SRM filters [12] are widely utilized to capture manip-
ulation clues (e.g., boundary anomaly, noise pattern incon-
sistencies). However, due to the limitation of handcrafted
methods, the SRM filters are vulnerable to malicious attacks.
In contrast, the constrained convolutional layer [10] (Con-
strained Conv) adaptively learn manipulation features directly
from data, which provides better universality and robustness.
Specifically, the constraint is applied as follows:{
wk(0, 0) = −1∑
m,n 6=0 wk(m,n) = 1
(1)
where wk denotes the kth convolution kernel, and (0, 0) is
the center coordinate of wk. wk are updated with the entire
model, and then the above constraint process is performed.
As shown in Fig. 3, we compare the visualization results
of the SRM filters (same as [5]) and the Constrained Conv
(trained with our model). The second to fourth columns are
the amplified regions of the red bounding boxes in the first
column. On the whole, the Constrained Conv remains richer
information than the SRM filters. We can clearly distinguish
the object in the output of the Constrained Conv. From the
details of the tampered regions, the Constrained Conv high-
lights the noise inconsistency between the authentic regions
and the tampered regions (see Fig. 3 first-row third-column).
It demonstrates that Constrained Conv feature has the similar
effect of both RGB spatial feature and SRM feature.
According to the above comparative analysis, we design a
learnable manipulation feature extractor (LMFE) based on the
Constrained Conv to adaptively learn manipulation detection
features. As shown in Fig. 2, the LMFE takes a manipulated
image as input, which is forward through the Constrained
Conv layer for capturing rich manipulation clues. And then
the Constrained Conv feature is input to the ResNet-101 for
creating a unified feature representation of various content
manipulation. Compared with [5],the LMFE only has half
number of parameters due to the single-stream design.
2.3. Coarse Manipulation Detection (Stage-1)
In Stage-1, the proposed model performs manipulation tech-
niques classification and coarse manipulated region localiza-
tion, which mainly contains the attention regional proposal
network (RPN-A) and the prediction module.
RPN-A. As shown in Fig. 3, although the Constrained
Conv captures rich manipulation clues, it loses a lot of con-
tent information (e.g., color, brightness). The lack of content
information weakens the inter-class discrimination of global
features and ultimately impairs manipulation segmentation.
To address this issue, we design an attention regional
proposal network (RPN-A) to make the network learn fea-
ture representation with strong inter-class distinctive abili-
ties. Specifically, a convolutional block attention module [13]
(CBAM) is added to region proposal network [14] (RPN).
The CBAM first infers two attention maps along two sepa-
rate dimensions, spatial and channel. Then, these two atten-
tion maps are multiplied to the input feature map for a more
discriminative feature. Next, RPN-A utilizes the feature map
from CBAM to propose the regions of interest (RoIs) that is
the potential manipulated regions, where the tampered region
is defined as foreground rather than the objects region [5].
For training RPN-A, the loss function is designed follow-
ing [14]. Formally, we define the loss of RPN-A as:
LRPN−A({pi}, {ti}) = 1
Ncls
∑
i
Lcls(pi, p∗i )
+λ
1
Nreg
∑
i
p∗iLreg(ti, t∗i ) (2)
where pi and p∗i denote the classification probability and the
label of anchor i. ti and t∗i denote the four dimensional co-
ordinate of anchor i and ground-truth, respectively. Ncls and
Nreg are the size of mini-batch and the number of anchors
locations. Lcls is the cross-entropy classification loss. Lreg
denotes smooth L1 loss for the bounding boxes of proposals.
λ is a balancing parameter and defaults to 10.
Prediction Module. After RPN-A, the RoI Align [11]
crops and resizes the local feature in RoI to the same size.
And then, the fully connected and softmax layers are ex-
ploited to the manipulation techniques classification and the
bounding box regression (coarse manipulation localization).
We use cross-entropy loss for final manipulation classifi-
cation and smooth L1 loss for final bounding box regression.
The loss function of Stage-1 is defined as:
LStage−1 = LRPN−A + Lcls pred + Lbbox pred (3)
where LRPN−A is the loss of RPN-A, Lcls pred is the final
classification loss, Lbbox pred is the final bounding box re-
gression loss. Finally, the three losses care summed together
to produce the loss function for Stage-1, as same as [14].
2.4. Fine Manipulation Detection (Stage-2)
In Stage-2, the coarse localization information from Stage-1
guides the model to further refine local features and performs
manipulation segmentation on pixel level.
Considering there exists rich forgery clues on the bound-
ary of tampered regions, we design a skip structure to intro-
duce the low-level features (Conv 3x) that contain more de-
tails and fuse it with high-level features (CBAM) by element-
wise addition (see Fig. 2). For matching the input size of the
Conv 5x block, a convolutional layer with kernel size 1 × 1
expands the channel of the global enhanced features to 1024.
Meanwhile, Stage-2 further refines the local feature by
exploiting the bounding box from Stage-1. Assume that the
batch size of Stage-2 is N , and the size of bounding boxes is
N × 4. First, the RoI Align crops and resizes the local en-
hanced feature to N × 7 × 7 × 1024. Next, local feature is
input to the Conv5 x block of ResNet-101 for finer local fea-
tures with size N × 7× 7× 2048. Finally, the decoder learns
the mapping from local feature to pixel-wise prediction for
tampered region segmentation. More specifically, a deconvo-
lutional layer is exploited to upsample and decrease the chan-
nels of local feature (output size N × 14 × 14 × 256). As a
transition, a convolutional layer with kernel size 1× 1 further
decreases the number of channels to 64. Since the manipu-
lation classification has been performed in Stage-1, the class-
agnostic segmentation is exploited for reducing the complex-
ity of the model. Therefore, the output size of the second
convolutional layer is N × 14 × 14 × 2. Finally, a softmax
layer is exploited to predict the pixel-wise classification.
During training, we crop the tampered region on the
ground truth mask and resize it to 14× 14. Then, the average
binary cross-entropy loss function is used to compute the loss
between the predicted mask and the adjusted ground-truth.
Table 1. AP comparison on COCO synthetic dataset.
AP COCO Synthetic test
RGB-N [5] 0.745
Conv-C Net 0.790
Conv-C Net + CBAM-34R 0.779
Conv-C Net + CBAM-4 0.795
Conv-C Net + CBAM-4R 0.801
Conv-C Net + CBAM-R 0.806
Finally, we obtain the predicted content manipulation
class and the binary mask of tampered regions. The total loss
is defined as Ltotal = LStage−1 + LStage−2, where Ltotal
denotes the total loss of Constrained R-CNN, LStage−1 is the
loss of Stage-1 defined in Eq. 3, and LStage−2 is the average
binary cross-entropy loss of Stage-2.
3. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we investigate the effectiveness of each part in
Constrained R-CNN. We evaluate the proposed model on four
image forensics benchmarks and compare the results with
state-of-the-art methods. We also compare the influence of
different data augmentation methods for our model.
3.1. Implementation Details
The proposed network is trained end-to-end. During training,
we find the gradient will explode if the entire model is trained
end-to-end directly. To overcome this issue, we first pre-train
LMEF and Stage-1, where the ResNet-101 is initialized by
ImageNet weights. On image forensics benchmarks, we train
the entire model end-to-end with pre-trained weights. We will
release the source code of our model.1
The input image is resized so that the shorter side of the
image is 600 pixels. Image flipping is used for data augmenta-
tion. The batch size of RPN-A proposal is 256 for training and
300 for testing. The batch size of Stage-2 is 4 for training and
8 for testing. We pre-train our model for 110K steps. Learn-
ing rate is initially set to 1e− 3, and then is reduced to 1e− 4
and 1e − 5 after 40K steps and 90K steps, respectively. All
experiments are performed on single NVIDIA 1080Ti GPU.
3.2. Pre-trained Model
As current standard datasets do not have enough data for deep
neural network training, some works utilize semantic seg-
mentation datasets to create the manipulated image dataset
[5, 6]. For fair comparison, we use the same COCO syn-
thetic dataset2 as [5] to pre-train Stage-1. The output of the
pre-trained model is bounding boxes with confidence scores
1https://github.com/HuizhouLi/Constrained-R-CNN
2https://github.com/pengzhou1108/RGB-N
Table 2. F1 score comparison on four benchmarks.
Methods NIST16 COVER Columbia CASIA
NOI1 [15] 0.285 0.269 0.574 0.263
ELA [16] 0.236 0.222 0.470 0.214
MFCN [8] 0.570 - 0.612 0.541
RGB-N [5] 0.722 0.437 0.697 0.408
Ours-Base 0.920 0.750 0.709 0.469
Ours 0.927 0.757 0.790 0.475
Table 3. AUC comparison on four benchmarks.
Methods NIST16 COVER Columbia CASIA
NOI1 [15] 0.487 0.587 0.545 0.612
ELA [16] 0.429 0.583 0.581 0.613
J-LSTM [9] 0.764 0.614 - -
H-LSTM [6] 0.794 0.712 - -
RGB-N [5] 0.937 0.817 0.858 0.795
MT-Net [7] 0.795 0.819 0.824 0.817
Ours-Base 0.991 0.918 0.818 0.786
Ours 0.992 0.939 0.861 0.789
denoting the probability of the box containing tampered re-
gions. Following [5], we also use average precision (AP) for
Stage-1 evaluation, same as the COCO detection evaluation.
We compare the AP of RGB-N and various model archi-
tectures in Table 1. We reproduce the experiment of RGB-N
on the same COCO synthetic dataset, the result is better than
literature. The Conv-C Net is a single-stream Faster R-CNN
model with the Constrained Conv. The string after ’CBAM’
denotes the location of the CBAM module in Conv-C Net,
where ’3’, ’4’ denote Conv 3x and Conv 4x respectively,
the letter ’R’ denotes the first convolutional layer in RPN.
The experimental results demonstrate that Constrained
Conv significantly improves the AP with only half parame-
ters. In addition, we explore the effect of the CBAM for our
model. As same as the discussion in Section 4.3, adding a
CBAM in RPN makes it learn a feature with strong inter-class
distinctive ability. Compared with RGB-N, the Conv-C Net +
CBAM-R (pre-trained model) improved the AP by 6.1%.
3.3. Experiments on Standard Datasets
We compare our method with different state-of-the-art meth-
ods on four manipulated image benchmarks: NIST16 [17],
CASIA [18], COVERAGE [19], and Columbia datasets [20].
The training and testing protocol of datasets is the same as
[5, 8, 9]. The Colombia dataset is not exploited for training,
only for testing the model trained on the CASIA weights.
Following conventional settings[8, 21], we report the
pixel-level F1 score and the area under the ROC curve (AUC)
for performance evaluation. For each output map, we vary
different thresholds to get the maximum F1 score as the final
score, which follows the same protocol in [5, 8, 21]
Table 2 describes the comparison of F1 score between our
method and the baselines. Table 3 shows the comparison of
Table 4. Comparison of data augmentation methods. Flip-
ping: Image flipping horizontally. Noise: Gaussian noise with
the mean of 0 and the variance of 5. JPEG: JPEG compression
with quality 70. Each entry is F1/AUC score.
F1/AUC NIST16 COVER CASIA
None 0.917/0.989 0.742/0.918 0.467/0.768
Flipping 0.927/0.992 0.757/0.939 0.475/0.789
Flipping + Noise 0.926/0.991 0.736/0.933 0.445/0.753
Flipping + JPEG 0.926/0.993 0.738/0.903 0.498/0.805
All 0.923/0.991 0.646/0.884 0.485/0.784
Table 5. AP comparison on multi-class on NIST16 dataset.
AP Splicing Copy-move Removal Mean
RGB-N [5] 0.960 0.903 0.939 0.934
Ours 0.943 0.999 0.875 0.939
AUC. ’-’ denotes that the corresponding results are not pro-
vided in the literature. We obtain the results of NOI1 and
ELA, from [5] and [8]. The results of MFCN, J-LSTM, H-
LSTM, RGB-N, MT-Net are replicated from the original pa-
pers.
From the results in Table 2 and Table 3, we can find
that Constrained R-CNN exhibits significant improvement
compared with state-of-the-art methods. Especially, the F1
score of our model is increased by 0.205, 0.32, and 0.093
on the NIST16, COVERAGE, and Columbia datasets, with
the growth rates of 28.4%, 73.2%, and 13.3%, respectively.
In addition, we also demonstrate the effectiveness of the
skip structure in Table 2 and Table 3. Ours-Base is another
architecture that is the same as Constrained R-CNN but with-
out skip structure. Compared with Ours-Base, Constrained
R-CNN significantly improves the performance of detection.
As shown in Table 4, we compare the effects of differ-
ent data augmentation method. Compared with other meth-
ods, image flipping provides significant improvement on two
datasets. JPEG compression improves the performance of the
model on CASIA dataset, and the AUC of Constrained R-
CNN is comparable to state-of-the-art model [7].
3.4. Manipulation Techniques Classification Comparison
We argue that image manipulation detection consists of clas-
sification and localization. The NIST16 dataset provides
labels for three content manipulation techniques: splicing,
copy-move, and removal. For fair comparison, we use the
classification result on bounding box level.
As shown in Table 5, Constrained R-CNN achieves state-
of-the-art performance on the entire dataset. Compared with
[5], Constrained R-CNN demonstrates significant improve-
ments in copy-move detection and shows comparable perfor-
mance to RGB-N on splicing detection.
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Fig. 4. Qualitative visualization of localization results.
3.5. Qualitative Comparison
In Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, we compare the detection results wtih
RGB-N [5] and MT-Net [7]. Sincec there do not provide the
label of manipulation technique in the COVERAGE, Colom-
bia, and CASIA dataset, Fig. 4 only shows the manipula-
tion localization results of them. In Fig. 5, we compare the
detection results of different manipulation techniques on the
NIST16 dataset. We also show the complete detection re-
sults of our model (the last column in Fig. 5), which contain
manipulation techniques classification and manipulation lo-
calization.
As shown in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, the constrained R-CNN
produces good performance of manipulation techniques clas-
sification and better performance of manipulation localization
than other models. This is because the coarse-to-fine design
allows our model to perform detection tasks in the local re-
gions, which avoids excessive noise in the output mask and
ensures more accurate segmentation results.
4. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a coarse-to-fine architecture named
Constrained R-CNN for image manipulation detection, which
can simultaneously perform manipulation techniques classifi-
cation and manipulation segmentation. Compared with pre-
vious methods, our model can capture manipulation clues di-
rectly from data without any handcrafted component, and thus
is more general and effective for complex image forensics.
Experiments on four manipulated image benchmarks demon-
strate that our method achieves state-of-the-art performance
in both manipulation classification and localization.
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